In this paper an approach is presented in which heurkstic reasoning is interpreted as strategic reasoning. This type of reasoning enables one to den've which hypothesis to investigate, and which observable information to acquire next (to be able to verify the chosen hypothesis). A compositional architecture for reasoning systems that perform such heuristic reasoning is introduced, called SIX (for Strategic Interactive expert systems). This compositional architecture enables user interaction at strategic level. It is formally specified in the specification framework DESIRE (DEsign and Specification of Interacting REsoning modules). We show that this reasoning method can adequately be applied to deal with relative incompleteness in domains that have a (layered) empirical basis. A logical analysis of domains is presented making these concepts more precise. A theorem is presented stating that a domain has an empirical basis if and only if a decisive knowledge base is possible. Moreover, a simple criterion is given to test whether or not a domain is empirically founded: implicit definability of hypotheses in terms of observables.
INTRODUCTION
In this introduction we briefly discuss our view on the role of incomplete information in diagnostic reasoning. Furthermore we introduce two interpretations that can be given to heuristic conclusions in such a reasoning process. We argue that the compositional architecture for Strategic Interactive expert systems (SIX) that will be described in this paper is an adequate architecture to model heuristic reasoning interpreted as (explicit) strategic reasoning (to overcome incompleteness). We point out that incompleteness is related to whether or not the domain has an empirical basis, and that relative incompleteness can be defined by the notion of a layered empirical basis. Finally, an overview of the paper is given.
The Role of Incomplete Information in Diagnostic Reasoning
In diagnostic (or classificational) reasoning processes conclusions are based, on the one hand, on general domain knowledge and, on the other hand, on a restricted amount of specific additional information on the object being diagnosed or classified. The art of diagnostic reasoning lies in deciding which additional information should be acquired, and in which order. This effort of acquiring additional information may be measured by a certain cost function, expressing costs in the sense of money, or risk, or time, et cetera, or of any combination of these criteria. Often one will try to optimize the diagnostic reasoning process by minimizing the cost of additional information that is needed.
Usually, at any moment in such a diagnostic reasoning process the key issue is how to handle the incompleteness of information. Often this incompleteness is only relatiue, i.e., at first one tries to avoid acquiring certain information (which is expensive to acquire), but if it is important enough, then this information may be made available. For instance, one may think of a family doctor or a health centre where some tests may be done easily, but for other tests a patient has to be referred elsewhere, e.g., to a medical specialist in a certain subdomain. A certain type of strategic reasoning is needed to determine what part of the unknown information is important enough to be acquired, and to find a balance between this importance and the costs of acquiring the information (we call this an observation).
If in a situation only incomplete information is available, and nevertheless conclusions are required, it will have to be accepted that this leads to statements not concerning the truth of a relevant conclusion but about its probability, or plausibility, or (strategic) priority, or any other qualification of it. These statements are often called heuristic conclusions. One of the main questions is how the reasoning proceeds using such conclusions.
Two Interpretations of Heuristic Conclusions
Roughly two approaches to heuristic conclusions may be distinguished, each corresponding to a different interpretation of the word "heuristic":
a) The reasoning proceeds in a uniform manner, according to the same derivation rules as in the case that the conclusions concern truth (i.e., are certain). Additionally, running parallel with this reasoning, for each conclusion its uncertainty is determined and associated with
Heuristic Reasoning and Relative Incompleteness 53 that conclusion as a numerical or symbolic label; we call this type of reasoning reasoning with propagation of uncetiainty (in [5] this is called parallel uncertainty inference). Here the word heuristic is interpreted as "plausible" or "probable." b) The conclusions are used to control the process of reasoning; these conclusions are interpreted as strategic conclusions, and the process of drawing and using such conclusions may be called strategic reusoning (to overcome incompleteness in a selective manner). In this case a heuristic conclusion may be interpreted as: "this hypothesis is worth investigating further." Because control is guided by these conclusions, reasoning will focus on such a hypothesis; therefore such conclusions usually will also affect what additional information is acquired. In the case of relative incompleteness it may be important to make reasoned choices on what (expensive) information to acquire, to be able to justify these choices by rational arguments. This requirement suggests an approach based on b) as described above in which the strategic reasoning behind these choices has been made explicit.
A Compositional Architecture for Strategic Interactive Expert Systems
To design knowledge-based systems that perform or support diagnostic tasks in the sense described above, detailed logical analysis is needed of the reasoning patterns involved and of the properties of domains for which this type of reasoning may occur (also see [20, 221) . This paper is a contribution to such an analysis. Our approach is based on a functional decomposition of a complex reasoning task into primitive reasoning subtasks that can be described transparently and declaratively by reasoning components, and that interact with each other in a precisely defined manner according to standardized interaction types (see [21] ). The architecture obtained in this manner is called a compositional architecture.
To be able to describe such an architecture in a detailed and precise manner we use our framework DESIRE (framework for DEsign and Specification of Interacting REasoning modules). This framework has been developed in our research group to be able to express formal specifications of compositional architectures of complex reasoning systems (for a short introduction, see [14] , [16] ). In DESIRE it is possible to distinguish between the generic, domain-independent (but task-specific) aspects of a specification and the domain-specific details. The generic, task-specific part of a specification is sometimes called a genetic tusk model (see [14] ).
The formal description of the appropriate reasoning patterns as studied in this paper has been used to develop the compositional architecture for Strategic Interactive expert systems: SIX. This compositional architecture is based on the interpretation of heuristic reasoning in the sense of explicit strategic reasoning; it is described in some detail in this paper. One of the main motives underlying the design of SIX is to handle (and partly to overcome) relative incompleteness. The relative incompleteness is handled by explicit strategic reasoning. Therefore in SIX the choices on which hypothesis to investigate and on which information to acquire can be justified by rational arguments. Moreover, systems based on SIX are able to perform bilateral interaction with the user on these strategic arguments.
Empirically Foundedness and a Decisive Knowledge Base
Usually, a knowledge-based system contains knowledge on the logical connections between observable quantities and hypotheses; for instance for medical diagnosis the hypotheses are the diseases and the observable quantities are the symptoms, and the knowledge of the system relates these to each other. The system may perform reasoning, i.e., from the available information (observations: symptoms, outcomes of tests for a patient) that is asked from the user, conclusions may be derived by logical inferences, using the knowledge in the knowledge base. When the available knowledge base and the additional information, which in principle can be acquired from the user, enables the system to derive all conclusions about hypotheses that are wanted, the knowledge base is called decisiue. Whether or not for a given domain such a decisive knowledge base is possible, depends on the empirical nature of the domain: it will be shown that a decisive knowledge base can be obtained if and only if the domain has an empirical basis (i.e., if every hypothesis is equivalent to a logical proposition composed of observable quantities; we call such domains empirically founded).
Even when a decisive knowledge base is possible, in many cases only a limited amount of information is available, and it is expensive or hard to acquire more information. This may imply that in practice not all relevant conclusions can be derived. In fact many human-defined domains such as financial domains or technical domains are empirically founded; the main problem may be that to get a certain specific piece of information high costs have to be paid (in the sense of money or in any other sense). Domains like these often satisfy a criterion of relative incompleteness in the sense that more information can be made available if some price is paid. The notion of relative incompleteness will be defined below in terms of a layered structure of the empirical basis. ing is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 strategic reasoning and strategic (user) interaction are discussed. In Section 4 the foundations, the specification and the implementation of our compositional architecture SIX are described.
The following sections address the more foundational aspects of the paper. In Sections 5 and 6 formal definitions of the notions of empirical basis and decisive knowledge base will be given, respectively, and their logical relation will be shown in Section 6. In Section 7 the notion of a layered empirical basis will be defined formally in order to obtain a more operational definition of the notion of relative incompleteness.
In Section 8 the two interpretations of heuristic conclusions, as introduced above, are discussed and compared in more detail; the case of hierarchical classification is analysed in more detail according to the notions introduced in this paper.
STRATEGIC REASONING PATTERNS
In this section we sketch how heuristic reasoning may be modelled by dynamic (modularised) reasoning patterns where both strategic reasoning and object reasoning take place.
In Figure 1 a domain is depicted where the information S that possibly is to be requested has some layered structure S,. . . S,. The shaded areas s 1 Figure 1 . Strategic reasoning with relatively incomplete information represent information that is requested from the user during a given session; since each layer is scaled to the same size, in fact the shaded areas represent the fractions of information that are requested.
The complex process of reasoning that is performed may be sketched as follows:
1. From the information on S, it is reasoned (heuristically) which hypotheses are worth investigating further and which information from S, is needed for that purpose. 2. This information is acquired. 3. From the information known from S,, . . . , Si it is reasoned (heuristically) which hypotheses are worth investigating further and which information from Si + , is needed for that purpose.
Notice that if the heuristic conclusions do not entail a guarantee that the search they suggest will provide a solution, then backtracking may be needed. By this process a deliberate and reasoned selection is made for the information to be acquired. This may result in actually acquiring just a fraction of the complete information from S (for instance *log#(S) instead of #W, the number of elements of S, if the information has a tree structure). In Fig. 1 this process is depicted by the arrows and the shaded areas. Of course this is only a schematised form of the type of heuristic reasoning that may occur; for instance in some situations it may be useful to acquire some information from a lower layer first, or some other type of backtracking may occur.
The complex reasoning as described above may be represented as an interaction between two levels of reasoning:
-strategic reasoning this reasoning makes use of (either domain-specific or domain-independent or both) strategic knowledge to draw strategic conclusions -object reasoning this reasoning makes use of domain knowledge as contained in a knowledge base KB expressing logical connections between observables and hypotheses A distinction may be made between drawing strategic conclusions concerning which hypotheses have to be further investigated and drawing strategic conclusions concerning what information to acquire. These two types of strategic conclusions may be considered independently, but in many cases they are strongly related, given the domain knowledge on the logical connections between hypotheses and observables. On the one hand, if at the strategic level strategic conclusions are drawn on which of the hypotheses to investigate further, then by reasoning at the object-level (for instance goal-directed reasoning) this may lead to requesting the informa-tion on observables which is needed for drawing conclusions on the selected hypotheses. On the other hand, if at the strategic level strategic conclusions are drawn on what information to acquire, and this information has actually been acquired, then by reasoning at the object-level, from this information some conclusions may be drawn (for instance by datadriven reasoning); these are conclusions on certain hypotheses. This implicitly determines the hypotheses that are involved. Summarizing, there are three main possibilities for the interaction between reasoning at the strategic level and reasoning at the object-level:
-strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on which hypotheses to investigate further; subsequently the choice for the information to acquire is determined by (goal-directed) object reasoning -strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on what information to acquire; subsequently the choice for which hypotheses are investigated is determined implicitly by (data-driven) object reasoning -strategic reasoning to draw conclusions on which hypotheses to investigate further and strategic conclusions on what information to acquire are drawn by separate strategic processes of reasoning; these strategic processes may interact in one way or another An example of the last possibility is the compositional architecture SIX (described in some more detail in Sections 3 and 4 below), where first there is strategic reasoning on which hypotheses to investigate further and secondly there is strategic reasoning to conclude which tests are the most adequate ones to discriminate between these hypotheses. Both processes of reasoning take place at the strategic level.
STRATEGIC REASONING AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION
The reasoning patterns as sketched in Section 2 have been implemented in a prototype system based on the generic task model introduced in the current section. In Section 4 the dynamics of the behaviour will be discussed in more detail.
The generic task model describes the abstract structure for a certain class of compositional Strategic Interactive expert systems (SIX). At this moment prototype applications have been developed for medical diagnosis (SIMEDES; see [S] ) and for saving advices (SISAS). Both applications are based on a generic implementation called SIX Shell (implemented in NEXPERT OBJECT, trademark of Neuron Data). In Section 3.1 we will give a global description of the generic task model. In Section 3.2 we will discuss in more detail the types of interactivity that are supported by this task model.
A main design criterion has been that the systems that are considered should be able to follow the trace of an arbitrary diagnostic process as performed by a user, even if, viewed strategically, this process is very inefficient. This criterion requires a manner to express such an arbitrary trace by certain marking points. The marking points chosen are the set of preferred hypotheses to be considered (differential), with priority factors assigned to them, and the set of preferred observations with priority factors. This provides a basic mechanism to follow the steps taken by a user. Furthermore, the system should be able to propose a reasonable continuation from any point in a diagnostic process the user has lead himself (and the system) to. This is a major difference compared with diagnostic processes based on a given taxonomy, because in that case only certain information states are possible, corresponding to nodes in the taxonomy: in general an arbitrary set of truth values of observables has no representation in the taxonomy. A third design goal has been to provide possibilities to discuss with the user aspects of the strategic choices such as costs of tests, etc.
The properties may have important advantages concerning the interactivity of the system: the user may experience the system as a support for his or her own reasoning more than in other cases where the system guides the reasoning. This may increase acceptance of expert system applications for users with some own expertise on the domain concerned. In particular, this may be very important if the system is used as an intelligent tutoring system to practice skills concerning diagnostic tasks in a certain domain. With SIX it is possible to offer a student an environment where any kind of diagnostic process may be tried out, including very inefficient processes. This provides the possibility for a student to learn from experience, or from 'mistakes' (inefficient diagnostic strategies). Both the systems SIMEDES and SISAS have been developed with this possible application in mind.
The Global Task Decomposition
A picture of the global task decomposition is given in Figure 2 . For the sake of convenience, observations are called tests. We will now shortly describe each of the reasoning subtasks.
HYPOTHESIS SELECTION Given certain (test) information, in this subtask priority factors for hypotheses are determined, indicating which one to investigate further. This list of priority factors is given to the user as a proposal. The reasoning involves information about the basic priority (criticality) of a hypothesis, but also information on how much evidence has been gathered about this hypothesis. The strategic interaction on Heuristic Reasoning and Relative Incompleteness 59 Figure 2 . Task decomposition hypothesis selection may result in a decision from the user about which hypothesis will be the focus hypothesis, thus overruling the proposal given by the system-determined priority factors.
TEST SELECTION Given a focus hypothesis in this subtask it is determined which test is the most adequate to perform for gathering more information. This is also expressed in terms of a list of priority factors on tests. The reasoning involves on the one hand information values for each test with respect to the hypothesis that is concerned; the system is able to determine these information values by inspecting its own knowledge. On the other hand the "cost" of a test is taken into account in the reasoning process; as was said earlier, it is this cost function that determines the layered structure of the empirical basis of the domain. Moreover, the strategic interaction on observation selection with the user takes place. This may result in a decision from the user about which test should be performed, thus overruling the proposal given by the system-determined priority factors.
TEST EVALUATION Given the outcome of the test that is chosen, in this subtask it is determined which conclusions may be drawn on (maybe abstract) hypotheses. Here it may be decided (by the user> whether a satisfactory diagnosis has been obtained.
The whole diagnostic process is the complex pattern of reasoning obtained by a cyclic interaction of these subtasks, as described in more detail Section 4.
Different Types of User Interactions
Most knowledge-based systems restrict the role of the user to providing the (domain) information the system requests. It is not possible to give explanations to the user concerning the strategic choices made by the system, and the user has no opportunity to propose alternative strategic choices. Many users would wish to play a different role; for a wider acceptation of knowledge-based systems, more extended forms of interactivity should be a necessary condition.
The well-known types of explanation (HOW, WHY and sometimes WHYNOT) are subject to criticism: nowadays these options are considered types of tracing rather than types of explanation. Users may want to see the reasoning strategy as a subject of the dialogue, especially if heuristic reasoning is involved. On the one hand this implies that the strategy should be affectable: otherwise there is no sense of discussing it. This brings in requirements on the way in which the control of the system is designed (flexibility). On the other hand the system should be able to give explanations on its strategy: otherwise the user does not know what it is all about. This also introduces requirements on the way in which the control of the system is designed: for giving deeper strategic explanations it is required that control is not only something that is performed by the system (implicit knowledge, in procedures) but also that the system has explicit knowledge about it and may communicate this (as data or knowledge) to the user. It turns out that the duality between procedural aspects (actions) and declarative aspects (data, knowledge that are processed) plays an important role in the type of modular systems we have developed; to obtain higher forms of flexibility and interactivity this duality will have to be explored.
The discussion above suggests that substantial improvement of interactivity in knowledge-based systems is not a matter of a "nice" user interface, but may only be obtained if, in the design of the structure of the system, the interactivity is taken into account.
To make the issue of interactivity more precise we distinguish the following types of interaction a system may provide: 1A) CONSERVATIVE INTERACTION ON THE OBJECT-LEVEL This is the type of interaction which occurs in most current diagnostic systems: the system asks the user to provide additional (domain) information on the situation that is reasoned about. By collecting this information the system extends its knowledge in a conservative way: facts that have become known as true or false will not change in their truth value. 1B) NONCONSERVATIVE INTERACTION ON THE OBJECT-LEVEL As a variant of la) this may occur in systems which have built in a belief revision system as a subsystem. In that case answer revision may be performed, for instance in diagnostic tasks. Another application is in dynamic process (and robot) control. Because in this case the situation that is reasoned about changes very often (for instance by executing planned actions), the reasoning has a nonconservative nature: sometimes truth values of facts will have to be revised. The system uses its sensor data to update the model it has of the situation. Here belief revision plays an important role in retracting facts that have been derived from facts that are no longer true. If it is assumed that a system may perform belief revision, then the user may interact with the system by actually intervening in the situation that is concerned. An example of this is to guide a robot arm by hand (globally) to a place where (locally) an object must be detected and picked up by the system with high precision. By this type of interaction high flexibility may be obtained, since the system adapts itself to the new situation by updating its model of the situation. The same type of interaction plays an important role in design tasks. An example of this is the following: suppose a (partial) design is displayed by a graphical interface and the user carries out some modifications of some parts of the design. In that case the system has to change its model of the design (redesigning) to obtain a consistent new design, or to conclude that the changes made by the user are inconsistent. 3 . BUILDING A USER MODEL ON STRATEGIC PREFERENCES The design of the above task decomposition enables one to tune the system's own strategy to the diagnostic style and preferences of the user. This may be done by determining certain parameter values that enable the reasoning modules on hypothesis and test selection to provide proposals that are in line with the user's style (user model). Examples of user aspects expressed in this user model are (1) how in general the user weighs information values and costs for possible observations (is the user acting economically or not); (2) the same for weighing basic priority (criticality) and the gathered evidence for hypotheses (is the user acting cautiously or fast).
FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPOSITIONAL ARCHITECTURE SIX
In this section we describe in more detail a formal specification of the compositional architecture based on the task decomposition for strategic interactive diagnosis and classification tasks that was introduced in the previous section. A compositional architecture (see [16] ) consists of components (reasoning modules) that are combined in a transparent manner by well-defined, standard construction principles (interaction types). We describe the compositional architecture of SIX and we explain what dynamic behaviour results from it. The specification of the architecture is based on our framework for DEsign and Specification of Interacting REasoning modules (DESIRE, see [14] , [16] ).
The approach we follow is to represent the strategic knowledge in an explicit manner, for instance as given in Figure 3 . Here s,, s2 are observables (symptoms), and the conclusion to-be-investigatedth,)
says that h, is a good candidate to consider as a possible hypothesis, if we know that si has been observed positively and s2 is not (yet) known. Our approach is to design a modular architecture in which each of the reasoning modules can perform reasoning subtasks in an autonomous manner, and the interaction between the modules provides a complex dynamic pattern of reasoning. These reasoning modules may either contain domain-specific or domainindependent strategic knowledge. This will be illustrated below.
DESIRE-Specification of SIX
The compositional architecture SIX, based on the task decomposition as depicted in Figure 2 consists of three modules. The first two reasoning modules reason at the meta-level and the third one reasons at the object observed-pos (s,) A known --, to-be-investigated(h,) level. The complex reasoning pattern is built up from the basic reasoning in each of the modules by defining a certain type of interaction between the modules. In [20] more details can be found on this notion of complex reasoning. Because the compositional architecture can be defined in a generic (domain-specific) manner its specification is in fact what is sometimes called a generic task model; in [14] a formal definition is given of the notion of generic task model. In this section we will discuss the specification of the generic task model, while in the Sections 4.2 and 4.3 example reasoning systems are discussed that can be considered instantiations of the generic task model. Each of the reasoning modules of SIX will be described by the following characteristics:
1. The logical language they use; i.e., the lexicon (or signature) from which the statements can be built. Here three subsets are specified: l the input signature: the elements of the language that may occur in input data for the reasoning module (observables) l the internal signature: the elements of the language that do not occur in input or output statements (language elements hidden for the other parts of the system) l the output signature: the elements that may occur in output data (hypotheses) 2. The knowledge base; this is often domain-specific, so it is usually left out in a specification of a generic task model (unless generic knowledge is given that is part of the generic task model).
We will give (informal) descriptions and (formal) generic specifications of the main part of each of the reasoning modules based on our specification framework DESIRE; for another variant see the example specification given in [15] .
TEST EVALUATION MODULE The role of this module is to provide specific information concerning various aspects of the object being diagnosed, and to draw conclusions from this. When a new symptom is found, hypotheses can be confirmed or rejected (on the basis of (domain specific) rules which express logical relations between symptoms and hypotheses). The generic part of this module is specified as follows: Here symptom and diagnosis are two unary relations on sorts Symptoms and Diagnoses, respectively.
HYPOTHESIS SELECTION MODULE The task of this module is to determine which hypothesis, in the given current state of the diagnostic process, should be investigated first. Its output consists of atoms of the form to-be-investigated(h).
As input the module receives information about the evidence that has been gathered so far (which symptoms have been observed or not, which symptoms are still unknown, which hypotheses have been rejected). Applying its (domain-specific) strategic knowledge it generates intermediate conclusions of the form hyp-priorityth, pf), where h is a hypothesis and pf is the priority factor assigned to it. Based on this, the module makes a choice of a hypothesis that should be selected. The user may have strategic interaction with this module to affect the choice. Formally, the generic specification of this reasoning module is as follows: Values is a binary relation (predicate) with arguments from sort Hypotheses and Values respectively, meaning that the hypothesis has a priority as indicated by the value, Notice that in this meta-signature for convenience sake we use the same names for the functions symptom and diagnosis as the corresponding relation symbols in the object-level module test evaluation.
TEST SELECTION MODULE This reasoning module determines possible candidates for tests that could be carried out, and selects one of them. Its output consists of atoms of the form to-be-observed(s).
It contains knowledge about (logical and heuristic) relations between symptoms and hypotheses. When activated with to-be-investigated(h)
as an input, it will collect symptoms (of which the presence should be established) that are relevant for determining h. Applying its (domain-specific) strategic knowledge it generates intermediate conclusions of the form ohs-priority(obs, pf), where obs is an observation (e.g., symptom(s,)) and pf is the priority factor assigned to it. Based on this the module makes a choice of the test that should be carried out. Again, the user may have strategic interaction with this module to affect the choice. Note that the input for this module should also contain information about the current state of information of symptoms. Notice that in the signature current-state-and-focus-info the signature current -state -description (specified elsewhere) is imported by mentioning its name. Conclusions of this module (i.e., atoms of the form to-be-observed(s)) will be transformed by a downward interaction to targets of the Test Evaluation module, that will request them from the user, and derive conclusions about hypotheses, after the user has provided information about the requested symptoms.
Each of the strategic reasoning modules described above can be decomposed further into two reasoning modules: one that generates possible candidates, and another one that makes the right selection from these candidates. Also the test evaluation module can be decomposed further. Moreover, a decision module may be included in the cycle that monitors the whole diagnostic process and can take the decision to stop or continue the process. In [15] a more extensive task decomposition is described that makes this precise.
A Simple Example Reasoning System Based on a Part of SIX
Here we will present a simple system, as a partial instantiation of the (generic) compositional architecture specified in the previous section. The knowledge in this example system is not realistic, but it enables one to get an impression of the reasoning pattern that is induced by the specification. For the sake of convenience we leave out an instantiation of the test selection module in this section; it will be added in the next section. and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) if observed-pos(symptom(s, )> and not determined(diagnosis(h ,l) then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) if observed-neg(symptom(s,))
and not determined(diagnosis(h,)l then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) if observed-neg(symptom(s,))
and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) This module will be used in a data-driven fashion. We denote the objects in the sorts of names of symptoms and diagnosis by the same symbols as the objects in the corresponding sorts in the object-level module test evaluation. Notice that in this case in the knowledge base we only use part of the generic signature. The internal signature has been left out.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MODULES The interaction is defined such that a conclusion of module 2 of the form to-be-investigated(h) is transformed by the general interpretation mechanism in the background to the action of adding h as a goal to module 1. This is the downward connection between the modules (from strategic level to object level). The upward connection is provided by translating information on observables (as acquired by module 1 during its goal-directed reasoning) to input information for module 2. The alternation of reasoning with module 1 and reasoning with module 2 provides a complex diagnostic reasoning process in which explicit strategic elements occur as meta-level reasoning (i.e., in module 2).
To give a formal description of traces of a reasoning process the notion of partial model as known from logic is useful: in the propositional case a partial model is an assignment of truth values to a subset of the set of atoms (also see [23] ). A logical description of the interactions between the modules can be obtained by defining two transformation functions OCR, 01~ on sets of (pairs of) partial models describing the information states of the modules. A formal trace of the reasoning process using these transformations is shown in Fig. 4 . Here a block denotes a pair of partial models, the first of which represents the (object) information the module has of the outside world; the second partial model of the pair represents (meta-) information the module has of some aspects of its own inference state (i.e., the goals on its goal list). The horizontal arrows are the transformations to define the interaction between the modules and the vertical arrows are the transformations of information states induced by the reasoning process in the module that is concerned. This formalisation is discussed in more detail in U41, M.
TRACE OF AN EXAMPLE SESSION Suppose our example system has a session with an (external) situation such that the observable part has the following description; this is to be read as an assignment of truth values to the tuple of atoms (symptom(s,),symptom(s,),symptom(s,),symptom(s,),
Assume we start the system by giving the truth value of symptomh,) to module 1, as an initial observation. Then the complex reasoning pattern results in the trace as given in Figure 5 below. Here partial models are denoted by the list of atomic statements and negations of atomic statements that are true. For shortness only the relevant facts are depicted.
The process stops if one of the hypotheses has been confirmed. In the special case that the domain is structured by a taxonomy it is not difficult to change (the knowledge base of) module 2 into a module such that the bimodular system performs hierarchical classification. This can be done by representing in this module knowledge of the form if confirmed(diagnosis(h)) and not determined(diagnosis(h,)) then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) for every node h of the taxonomy and every child h, of this node, or the equivalent but more generic representation:
subnode( h, , h) if confirmed(diagnosis( H)) and subnode(H,, H) and not determined(diagnosis( H , )) then to-be-investigated(diagnosis(H,))
A logical description for this reasoning pattern is given in [20] .
Extending the Example by Explicit Test Selection
The example system as described above can easily be extended by the following test selection module; this provides a compositional system with three modules, where both hypothesis selection and observation selection are performed by explicit strategic reasoning processes. The other two modules remain the same, except that the test evaluation module is now used in a data-driven fashion. and not known(symptom&)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,))
if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s3)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h2)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,) ) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed (symptom(s, 1) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated (diagnosis(h,)) and not knowntsymptomts,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h,) ) and not knowntsymptom(s,)) then to-be-observedtsymptom(s,)) if to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h5)) and not known(symptom(s,)) then to-be-observed(symptom(s,))
Notice that for each hypothesis two different observations are possible; if both observations are not yet known, this implies a certain non-deterministic choice. In this design, for simplicity this choice may be thought of as being determined by the order of the elements of the knowledge base. In the design of SIX, the choice is made explicit in the sense of priority factors assigned to observations.
INTERACTION AMONG THE THREE MODULES The interaction is defined in such a way that this time a conclusion of module 2 of the form to-be-investigated(diagnosis(h))
is simply given as a datum to module 3. A conclusion of module 3 is transferred to a transformation of the partial model of module 1 in such a way that the truth value of the observable as indicated is added to the partial model. Processing the cycle consisting of respectively module 1, module 2, module 3 provides a complex diagnostic reasoning process in which this time explicit strategic elements on both hypothesis selection and observation selection occur as meta-level reasoning.
Notice that in the simple example given above, in fact the goal-directed backward chaining inference regime has been decomposed into two modules reasoning data-driven (forward).
In less simple cases more interesting domain-specific strategic knowledge on hypothesis selection or on observation selection can be put in the knowledge bases of the modules 2 and 3. For instance it may be stated that certain hypotheses entail risks for the patient. These critical hypotheses may be investigated first, or in any case can have some priority. Moreover, if there are more possibilities in a given situation, the choice on which observation to do may also depend on explicit knowledge about the COST of an observation, or on the damage an observation may cause. Also it is possible to add predicates in the conditions of strategic rules that refer to the user: the user will have to be asked whether or not these conditions succeed. This enables us to give the user the opportunity to decide which hypotheses will indeed be concluded as "to be investigated" or "to be investigated first." This provides a form of interaction on a strategic level, as discussed in Section 3. To express these strategic properties in a finer-grained manner, it is useful to express conclusions of module 2 and module 3 by predicates about priority factors, instead of only indicating that something is a possible hypothesis or observation. All features described in this paragraph are available in SIX.
LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF A DOMAIN
In this and the following sections we give a formal analysis of concepts like decisiveness, incompleteness and relative incompleteness. These concepts turn out to be closely related to the empirical nature of the domain, and are applicable to the architecture six described in the earlier sections. More precisely, the concepts introduced in the Sections 5 and 6 apply to the object-level module of six whereas the analysis of Sections 7 and 8 applies to the strategic part of SIX.
Whether or not it is possible to attain decisive knowledge on some domain ultimately depends on the empirical nature of the domain. It appears that decisive knowledge is only attainable in domains that are empirically founded, i.e., for every hypothesis there exists a number of observable quantities (observables, e.g., symptoms) that may be used to decide whether or not this hypothesis is true. More precise definitions will follow below.
We will use a description in terms of propositional logic with a set of atoms A containing two subsets S (observable atoms, observables) and H (hypotheses). The set of atoms A collects all atomic propositions that are used in the knowledge-based system. The observable atoms are the atoms that may be asked by the system from the outside world; the hypotheses may be derived by logical inferences from the observables and may be offered to the user of the system. Special cases are: a) A is a disjoint union of S and H, or b) H = A. But it may also be the case that the set I of atoms which are not contained in S or H is not empty; we will call such atoms intermediate.
The domain W is defined as a given a number of truth assignments to the atoms (see also [19] >. The elements of W are models for situations that may occur in reality (for instance patient models containing all data of some patient). The reasoning is always about one of these situations; for an example see Section 6 below, or [19] . If M E W we denote by S(M) the set of observables which are true in M This example will be continued in Section 6. The following definitions are summarized from [19] ; there are a few changes in presentation. Note that the example given above satisfies these definitions. The proposition p in the definition above may be rewritten in a disjunctive normal form, i.e. in a disjunction of conjunctions of observables and negations of observables. It turns out that the following theorem holds. This is a version of the well-known theorem in logic, called Beth's theorem. For an explanation of the construction underlying the proof, see the Appendix; also see [19] .
Theorem
If A is finite, then for any W the following conditions are equivalent:
6) The hypotheses are implicitly definable in terms of S (ii) The hypotheses are explicitly definable in terms of S (iii) Each hypothesis is equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of observables and negations of observables.
n In the philosophy of science, for instance as in [12] , criteria are given which a certain domain (an empirical science) must satisfy in order to have an empirical basis. Informally stated, these criteria require that every statement is essentially testable. This means that for every statement there exists a number of tests such that the statement is true if and only if a certain logical combination of outcomes of these tests is satisfied. In our logical framework such a logical combination may be described formally as a logical proposition in terms of the observables. Assuming A finite this leads us to the following definition.
Definition
The set of observables S is an empirical basis for the domain W if the (equivalent) conditions of the above theorem are satisfied. If such a set S exists we say that the domain has an empirical basis (or is empirically founded). n Many domains are built up in such a manner that they are empirically founded. For instance in medical domains for every disease one tries to Heuristic Reasoning and Relative Incompleteness 75 give testable criteria which determine in what cases the disease occurs. In some cases these criteria are not correct or incomplete. However, there also exist cases in which essentially correct and complete criteria are available but in practical situations some of these criteria are not testable in an easy manner. For instance for testing a certain criterion the patient has to be referred to a specialist, or the test is expensive, or risky, or takes a long time, etcetera. Furthermore, it may be noted that domains in the area of human-defined worlds such as financial or technical domains often have an empirical basis. It holds for the domain of saving advices, and the system SISAS we developed for this domain.
DECISIVE KNOWLEDGE
In this section we give a precise definition for decisive knowledge. By KB (the knowledge base) we denote the knowledge that may be used by a knowledge-based system to derive hypotheses from the available information on symptoms of a patient (we use the medical metaphor although we might as well be dealing with determining malfunctions in a complex technical equipment).
By Ohs(M) + ,o, b we will denote that the hypothesis b is derivable from the information on the observable part of M (i.e., from S(M)) by use of the knowledge in KB (in [19] this type of inference is called 'mixing knowledge from theory and model' and the derivability relation is denoted by S(M) U KB k h). Notice that this notation expresses the fact that the system reasons interactively: the ObdM) refers to information as available in the outside world, and requestable by the system.
We start with a definition of decisiveness. Notice that in the definitions below the set of situations W is arbitrary; the definitions are relative with respect to W.
Definition
The knowledge-based system is sound if the hypotheses, which may be derived using the knowledge base KB from observables and negations of observables which are true in a given situation M E W, are actually true in M, i.e. if h E H and M E W then
Ohs(M) I-,h-MI=h
The knowledge in the system is decisive if for any situation M E W and any hypothesis h which is true in M a number of observables and a number of negations of observables can be found which are true in M and from which h can be derived using KB, i.e.,
We say a proposition has the rule-format if it is an implicational proposition c, A . * * A c, + h where b is an atom from A and each ci is either an atom or a negation of an atom from S, or an atom from A.
n Because in the reasoning the negations in these propositions are always requested from the model of the situation that is reasoned about, this format is essentially a Horn propositional format. This can be made precise by introducing for each observable s E S an additional observable s" which semantically plays the role of the negation of the observable s. In this sense the approach in this paper is similar to the approach of [19] where no negations are used. The next characterisation theorem shows us that for an empirically founded domain a knowledge base may always be constructed which is in rule-format and such that the resulting system is sound and decisive. We first state the theorem and afterwards we will give an example to illustrate it. For an explanation about the construction underlying the proof, see the Appendix; also see [19] .
Characterisation Theorem
If the set of atoms A is finite, then for any W the following are equivalent:
(i) W has an empirical basis (ii) A knowledge base KB in rule-format can be constructed such that the resulting system is sound and decisive with respect to W n Such a knowledge base may be constructed by taking the propositions that define the hypotheses, rewriting them to disjunctive normal form and distilling propositions in rule-format from them. For example, consider the set of atoms A = S U I U H of the example as given in Section 5. Suppose h,, h, are defined explicitly by M t= s1 A s1 A s3 -M I= h, M != s1 A s2 A s4 * M k h, for every M E W. Here the knowledge for the knowledge base may be acquired by taking the implications from left to right; this knowledge may be split up as shown in Figure 6 . For W in this case the truth assignments may be taken as also shown in Figure 6, corresponding to (si, s2, s3, s,; i,; h,,h,).
The situations in W are models of the theory KB; the theory KB is decisive with respect to the given situations. 
(1, l,O, 1) Figure 6 . Decisive knowledge base and situations
RELATJYE INCOMPLETENESS AND LAYERED EMPIRICAL BASIS
In this section we treat types of incompleteness originating from the fact that some observables are testable in principle, but in practice are not tested unless they have turned out to be important. We represent a simple form of this case by splitting up the set of observables of a domain into two disjoint subsets:
Here S, is the set of observables which may be used at once and S, is the set of observables which only may be used if they have turned out to be important. In the example above depicted in Figure 6 we may take s, = {SI,S2) s, = bJ,S'A If the domain is empirically founded with respect to S, and we restrict the set of observable atoms to S, then the domain W is not empirically founded, since in that case ObdM,) = ObdM,) and Hyp(M, 1 f Hyp(M,). Therefore from the Characterisation Theorem 6.2 of Section 6.1 it follows that no decisive knowledge base exists.
The problem is that in case si and s2 are satisfied in fact no conclusion can be drawn from the decisive knowledge shown in Figure 6 . Nevertheless, two of the three symptoms for the hypotheses h, and h, are satisfied, so there is apparent evidence that h, and/or h, may hold. This is a case of incomplete information (on the actual situation that is reasoned about); to draw conclusions from this incomplete information one is tempted to use a kind of heuristic knowledge (on the domain), for instance of the form as shown in Figure 7 .
Here some hidden conditions are denoted by . . . . In our example we happen to know which conditions are involved (but they are not testable in 78 Figure 7 . Heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness Jan Treur an easy way); it may also happen that we do not know these hidden conditions. In that case we may think of some imaginary decisive system hidden in the background, that may be used for theoretical analyses. In cases as described above we speak of relative incompleteness of the system restricted to a set of observables S,, relative to the system with a set of observables S.
The bipartition of S as given above may be extended to a partition into more subsets corresponding to a number of degrees of availability of information (recall that a partition of a given set is a collection of mutually disjoint subsets such that the given set is their union). This leads us to the following definition.
Definition
Suppose a partition of the set of observables S is given: s = s, u s, u s, u . . . The sequence of these subsets represents a layered structure on the set of obsetvables of the domain. A domain with such a sequence of subsets will be called a domain with a layered set of observables. If, moreover, the domain is empirically founded, then we call it a domain with a fayered empirical basis. The interpretation of this layered structure is that the higher i the harder is to acquire the information in Si. n As already has been shown, in Figure 1 the rectangle depicts the set of obsetvables S partitioned into the different layers; although different layers may contain different amounts of information, in the graphical representation of Figure 1 each layer is scaled to the same size. The layered Structure enables us to define the notion of relative incompleteness and to perform a structured pattern of strategic reasoning. The layers may be defined by some integer-valued or real-valued (cost) function on S indicating for each observable how hard it is to acquire. This is the way it is done in our system SIX.
Notice that such a layered structure in the set of observables, and the related notion of relative incompleteness, may be used both in the case that the domain is, or is not empirically founded. Although our formal analysis originated from a logical description of domains that are empirically founded, it has a broader applicability, as was pointed out by John F. Lemmer in a personal communication.
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF HEURISTIC CONCLUSIONS
The main question concerning the heuristic knowledge in Figure 7 is what type of conclusion may be derived from the information that is known (e.g., from s,, s2). On the one hand, if si, s2 are given it is not clear how much chance there is that the hidden conditions are satisfied. On the other hand, if si, s2 turn out to be true then this is rather strong evidence for taking h, and h, as serious possibilities to be true. Often it is argued that in this case one should draw heuristic conclusions. It turns out that in literature there are two different interpretations of the word heuristic. From one point of view heuristic conclusions are conclusions concerning the search strategy for the subsequent inference processes; in this case the conclusion may be drawn that the hypothesis h, (and also h,) should be further investigated. In earlier sections we have called this type of heuristic reasoning strategic reasoning. From another point of view heuristic conclusions are considered as uncertain conclusions that are drawn and used in further reasoning to draw new conclusions (again uncertain). In this approach the measures of certainty of (intermediate) conclusions are propagated in the reasoning; a final conclusion in general can only be drawn as the one with highest certainty measure. We call this type of heuristic reasoning reasoning with propagation of uncertainty (also see [5] for this distinction).
This distinction on the manner in which heuristic conclusions are handled can be applied to give an analysis of the literature and our architecture six described earlier; most approaches in literature fall in one of these two categories:
(1) heuristic reasoning considered as reasoning with propagation of uncertainty; (2) heuristic reasoning considered as strategic reasoning.
We will briefly mention some of the well-known approaches. We will also briefly discuss below the possibilities of each of these approaches to take into account the layered structure of the empirical basis of the domains as considered in this paper.
The Certainty Factor Model and the Bayesian Approach
The certainty factor model (see [3] ) and the Bayesian approach (for instance see [lo] , [18] ) are examples of reasoning with propagation of uncertainty. By these approaches the heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness, as given in Section 7, Figure 7 , is represented as shown in Figure 8 . The intended meaning of these statements is something like: "there is evidence for the hypothesis h, with a weight of 0.7." Using the certainty factor or Bayesian approach, it is not easy to take a layered structure of the empirical basis into account: this would lead to knowledge bases where control knowledge is represented implicitly by the order of rules or of conditions in rules. The maintainability of such knowledge bases may be hard without reconsidering the whole (implicitly represented) strategy of the system.
The Use of Abstract Hypotheses to Represent Heuristic Knowledge
Another approach to representing the heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness as given in Section 7, Figure 7 is by defining abstract hypotheses (for instance see [4] ). In the example of Figure 7 an abstract hypothesis h may be defined, subsuming the specific hypotheses h,, h,. If, for instance h,, h, are two infectious diseases, then for h the more abstract hypothesis 'infectious disease' may be taken (assuming there are no more infectious diseases). If we assume that each specific hypothesis is explicitly definable by a conjunction of observables and negations of observables, abstract hypotheses may be defined by the disjunction of all specific hypotheses which share a certain combination of observables (for instance si A sz). Assuming that in our example si A s2 only occurs in h,, h,, the heuristic knowledge related to incompleteness as given in Figure 7 may be represented by the knowledge shown in Figure 9 .
This may lead to a taxonomy of abstract hypotheses (an isa-hierarchy). To the hypothesis h in Figure 9 , a heuristic meaning may be assigned: "it is useful to investigate the infectious diseases." This is heuristic in the sense of strategy. A pattern of reasoning often used in taxonomies is hierarchical classification.
The complex process of hierarchical classification is built up from the following two processes (for a more complete description see [20] ): a) the reasoning to test whether some abstract hypothesis is true, b) the reasoning to determine a choice for other hypotheses that are worth investigating. The latter is done using the knowledge represented by the taxonomy, i.e., all or some of the children of a given hypothesis may be chosen. After such a reasoned choice of hypotheses the complex process proceeds by actually testing these hypotheses. For performing this more specific testing a more specific kind of knowledge is needed, for instance knowledge as represented in Figure 6 . In this case the partition of the set of observables S corresponds to the abstraction levels in the taxonomy.
In a taxonomy as described above, any abstract hypothesis h is equivalent to the disjunction of the more specific hypothesis hi just below (the children): for each situation M E W it holds Mkh-M!=h,vh, Therefore, viewed logically, deriving h actually is deriving a disjunctive conclusion. Such a disjunctive conclusion expresses a kind of nondeterminism or incompleteness: it is known that one of the disjuncts must be true, but it is unknown which one. The result of the interaction between the two basic reasoning processes (testing and choice of hypotheses) in the complex reasoning is that after deriving such a disjunction the testing inference process is started to decide which one of the disjuncts is true. By this interaction the nondeterminism or incompleteness is resolved. In this case the conclusion h has an apparent strategic meaning: h expresses a suggestion for the hypotheses which are worth investigating further (and for acquiring the information needed for that); i.e. the following strategic meaning of h is effectuated: 'the hypotheses h,, h, are worth investigating'. In fact h may be viewed as a synthetic denotation for the fact that, in view of the current information, the hypotheses h,, h, are serious possibilities; this essentially involves strategic conclusions on h,, h,.
Double Meaning of Heuristic Conclusions Using Abstract Hypotheses
In the treatment of the various ways to manage incomplete knowledge a remarkable issue arises. In partic'ular this appears in the pattern of reasoning as described in Section 8.2. A general hypothesis h which is derived during the inference process provides new information which may be interpreted and used in the continuation of the inference process in two essentially different ways:
-as object-knowledge: h is a statement about the object we are classifying and it is established that is holds; therefore it may be used as a con&tion in a rule like h A criterion, -+ h, to make a next inference step, for instance to derive other, more specific hypotheses -as strategic knowledge: h also entails a statement which gives a guarantee on the strategy of reasoning that may be followed; something like "if all specific hypotheses under h are tested then it is certain that one of them will be confirmed"; this may be concluded from h on the basis of the taxonomic structure that is given; if it is the case that h does not hold, this entails a statement of the form:
"if the specific hypotheses under h are tested then all will be rejected"
Both interpretations are essentially used in the continuation of the inference process: the object-interpretation in case h occurs in conditions of rules, the strategic interpretation to assure that some parts of the taxonomy may be left out of the searching. It is even possible that h does not occur in any rule; on the level of object-knowledge, deriving h then is not of any use. But the strategic knowledge entailed by h may play a crucial role in the continuation of the inference process. To effectuate this strategic knowledge some control mechanism is needed that reads the strategic interpretation of h and decides on the basis of knowledge which steps to take in the continuation of the inference process. This analysis provides a logical description of the process of hierarchical classification as an alternation of object-reasoning and meta-reasoning. Logically the switch from object-reasoning to meta-reasoning and vice versa may be described using reflection principles (see [24] , [20] ); these are transformations of object-knowledge to meta-knowledge or vice versa; for a more detailed treatment of these issues see [20] . In [l], [4] , [9] , [17] other approaches to meta-knowledge can be found.
The approach we follow in SIX, as described in earlier sections is to represent the strategic knowledge in an explicit manner, as explicit knowledge on the strategy of the system. In our approach the heuristic knowledge related incompleteness as given in Section 7, Figure 7 is represented by the strategic knowledge given in Figure 10 .
Here the choice has been made to relate heuristic conclusions to strategic information only, and not to any object level meaning.
Structuring a Domain with a Layered Empirical Basis in a Taxonomy
Given a domain, structured in the form of a taxonomy, the partitioning of the empirical basis S can be taken in correspondence to the abstraction true(s,) A true(+) + to-be-investigated(h,) true(s,) A true(+) + toAeAnvestigated(h,) Figure 10 . Heuristic knowledge expressed by explicit strategic knowledge levels in the taxonomy: for the hypotheses at the top of the tree it is thought to be easy to acquire the information needed and lower in the tree it is thought to be more difficult. By strategic reasoning at any level one of the branches is chosen; by this a selection is made both for the hypotheses and for the needed information. In this case it is clear that the total amount of information S essentially is an exponential function of the amount of information that is actually acquired. A well-known example in biology is the taxonomy of plants as in a flora; abstract hypotheses are families, genera, species, subspecies, etcetera.
The main question is of course whether a given domain with a layered empirical basis can be structured in the form of a taxonomy in such a way that the more expensive information indeed plays a role lower in the taxonomy. It is not clear in which domains and how a useful taxonomy may be built. If, for some domain, any set of observables is given and one is free to define suitable hypotheses, then the following may be done:
-choose an observable which separates the set of situations into two subsets which are in size as equal as possible, i.e., the observable is true in all situations of one of these subsets and false in all situations of the other subset; define two (abstract) hypotheses, corresponding to these two subsets -continue this process with each of the subsets
The process stops if for each of the subsets there is no atom which is true in one situation of the subset and false in another situation of the same subset. If at any stage of this construction two subsets may be found that are almost equal, then an efficient taxonomy is built with depth 'log n with n the number of leaves. But if each time only one element may be separated from the rest of the subset, then a very complex taxonomy results with depth equal to the number of leaves. This depends on the kind of observables that are available.
To take into account a given layered structure of the empirical basis of the domain, one should use the observables on which it is easy to acquire information first. It is not quite clear under which circumstances this will lead to a satisfactory taxonomy. If, moreover, in the domain considered a number of specific hypotheses already were established in the past of the development of the domain, then a taxonomy should also try to encapsulate these, since probably knowledge is available about them. But this, together with the requirements imposed by a given layered structure of the empirical basis, could make it very difficult to construct an efficient taxonomy.
There is more literature on building taxonomies for a given domain both in the field of automated knowledge acquisition and in the field of statistics, especially clustering analysis and related topics (for instance see [ill, [131) . Also some attention has been paid to optimal strategies for classification with expensive information (for instance see [6] , [7] ).
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of relative incompleteness related to the expense of information may be formalized in terms of a layered structure of the empirical basis of the domain. Systems that are designed to handle incompleteness may do so by using a certain kind of heuristic knowledge. A closer analysis of these approaches shows us that they are based on two essentially distinct interpretations of the notion of heuristic reasoning. First in the sense of reasoning with propagation of uncertainty and secondly in the sense of strategic reasoning about which hypothesis to investigate further. It turns out that the second approach is useful to handle domains with relative incompleteness. The strategic interactive compositional architecture SIX reflects this approach.
The compositional architecture SIX has been used for applications in two rather small domains: a medical domain (SIMEDES) and the domain of saving advices (SISAS). In the medical domain there was a desire to measure the cost of additional information according to different dimensions. In our approach, for the sake of convenience, only one-dimensional cost functions are considered. Of course one may combine different types of costs, such as the money and the time involved, in one cost function, and consequently, in one layered structure. Such a combined cost function expresses a fixed relation between the criteria involved. This implies, however, that the possibility is lost to make strategic choices based on the separate criteria. As an extension of the approach of this paper the more dimensional case of a number of cost functions might be studied.
In the (rather small) domain of saving advices it was hard to find a layered structure in the empirical basis: most information could simply be requested if it was required. An extension of this domain to more sophisticated ways to manage savings would be needed to fully exploit the techniques discussed in this paper.
